{"id":55190,"date":"2019-05-12T18:15:11","date_gmt":"2019-05-12T18:15:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thepubliceconomist.com\/?p=55190"},"modified":"2019-05-14T14:58:57","modified_gmt":"2019-05-14T14:58:57","slug":"lessons-from-the-financial-crisis-for-todays-managers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thepubliceconomist.com\/?p=55190","title":{"rendered":"LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR TODAY\u2019S MANAGERS"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

[We often hear the word the economy is in bad shape and this happened because to a worldwide financial crisis whose origin lies in the USA and it has impacted India too. Ever since the financial crisis, the world economy is yet to fully recover. Indian economy is also affected due to world-wide slowdown. What is this financial crisis? How it has impacted the world economy as well as India\u2019s? How it has impacted a common man, a housewife, and a college going student? What are the lessons for today\u2019s aspiring managers? <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The genesis of financial crisis of\n2007-2009 lies in the housing loan market of the U.S.A. A housing\/mortgage loan\nin the U.S.A during 1930s had extremely unusual structure biased towards the\nlenders \u2013 floating rate interest with 5 to 10 years maturity, payments\ntypically covered only the interest, and the principal balance due at the\nmaturity. The mortgage loan amount to property value, Loan-to-Value (LTV)\nratio<\/em>, was usually less than 50%. Due to difficulty in saving the principal\namount in short maturity period, the borrowers very often use to renegotiate\nthe loan. The lenders had the option to terminate the relationship at maturity\nand demand full repayment. Failing such repayment, the lender could seize and\nsell the property to recover its principal amount which was only half of the\nvalue of the property. After the Great Crash of the October 1929, many banks\nbecame bankrupt resulting in depositors losing their deposits, the value of\nhousehold property fell to about 50%, and mortgage loan banks were unable or\ndeclined to refinance the loans at all, and the borrowers could not pay their\ninterest amounts and\/or principal loan. During 1931 to 1935, there were\ntypically 250,000 foreclosures every year. This experience led the federal\ngovernment to transform the mortgage finance market in the United States. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

To stimulate mortgage lending &\ngive good access to mortgages to potential home buyers, the U.S. federal\ngovernment enacted National Housing Act of 1934 and 1938 which helped in\ncreating a number of government sponsored entities (GSE) like Federal Housing\nAdministration (FHA), the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, Fannie\nMae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, Freddie Mac), and the\nGovernment National Mortgage Corporation (GNMA, Ginnie Mae). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The structure of the mortgage changed\nwith the typical mortgage (called touchstone mortgage) <\/em>has a 30-year\nlife, fixed rate of interest, level payments, requires a down payment of about\n20 percent, and self-amortizing (interest as well as principal loan are paid\nduring the life of the loan in EMIs). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Savings and\nLoan Association (S&L) (also called Thrifts<\/em>), are typically home\nloan lenders in the U.S. When an S&L grants a loan to the borrower, it\nwould typically hold the loan for its life and service the loan itself by\ncollecting payments on the loan, along with payments on taxes and insurance.\nThis mortgage production method is known as Originate-to-Hold (OTH) model. In\nthis OTH model, the S&L deposits tied up in funding a particular mortgage\nrepresented \u2018dead money\u2019 during the life of the loan and as such those deposits\ncould not be used to expand home financing any further. In order to help the\noriginators – S&Ls to free their tied-up capital, the (GSE \u2013 Fannie Mae and\nFreddie Mac buy the loans which were guaranteed by Ginnie Mae. However, these\nGSEs use to buy only so called conforming <\/em>mortgages which should meet\nfour essential requirements – monthly mortgage payment for principal and\ninterest, property taxes, and property insurance should not exceed 28% of the\nborrower\u2019s before tax income. The total payment on the mortgage along with\nother obligations such as credit card payment, auto loan payment, etc. should\nnot exceed 36% of before-tax income; there should not be more than one late\npayment within the previous year & the borrower should have a specific\nlevel of credit score; the borrower should pay the closing costs and down\npayment along with cash in the bank to meet an additional two months of loan\npayment; and the loan size was also limited. Mortgages that do not meet these\nrequirements are nonconforming <\/em>mortgages. Mortgage loans fall into two\ncategories: prime and non-prime. Prime <\/em>loans are conforming loans. Nonprime\n<\/em>mortgages are of three types- Alt-A, Subprime, and HEL or HELOC. The\nnon-prime loans come under nonconforming loans. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and\nFreddie Mac were sold in the market through Securitization – <\/em>a financial\nmechanism under which various contractual debts\/loans like home loans, auto\nloans, credit card debt\/loan obligations, etc. are pooled together into a\nsingle contractual debt by a securitizer <\/em>and converted into financial\nsecurities like bonds carrying a rate of interest, a face value, duration etc.,\nand sold in the market to various investors. This mechanism was developed to\npromote liquidity in the marketplace. Mortgage-backed Securities (MBS) was <\/em>created\nout of a pool of only mortgage\/home loans and sold to investors in the form of\nmortgage pass-through <\/em>security or participation certificate. <\/em>From\n1970 until 1983, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued only pass-through\ncertificates guaranteed by Ginnie Mae. But this structure has limitations –\nGinnie Mae guarantee was available to relatively few mortgages, like FHA\n(federal home agency, a US govt. agency like National Housing Board in India)\nand VA (a US govt. agency for veterans \u2013 ex-servicemen and their spouses,\netc.), mortgages and the mortgage pool thus formed should be homogeneous \u2013 same\nprincipal amount, interest rate, maturity period, same credit quality, etc.\nAlso, <\/em>there was risk of prepayment \u2013 borrowers repaying the loan amount\nbefore maturity. This, prepayment risk was instrumental in developing more\nsophisticated types of MBS. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In June 1983, two investment bankers\n– Salomon Brothers and First Boston, helped Freddie Mac to introduce a new kind\nof sophisticated MBS \u2013 Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)<\/em>. CMO\nallowed the heterogeneous mortgages to be pooled together \u2013 different interest\nrates (adjustable or fixed), different maturities, different qualities (prime,\nsub-prime, Alt-A, etc.), etc. The cash flows from the pool <\/em>\u2013 interest\nand principal \u2013were sliced into various \u201ctranches<\/em>\u201d based on the\nseniority, typically divided into three <\/em>tranches: Senior<\/em>, Mezzanine<\/em>,\nEquity <\/em>or Toxic<\/em>. The payments \u2013 interest and principal are paid\nseniority-wise. Once the senior most tranche securities are paid-off, and then\nturn of next junior one will start, and so on. However, each \u2018tranche\u2019 security\nshould be first rated by a credit rating agency like S&P. Senior tranches\nconsist of securities with credit rating of AAA to A, Mezzanine with BBB to B,\nEquity with much lower rating or no ratings. Senior tranche being AAA to A are\nconsidered to be much safer as they signify low default risk, so this tranche\ncarry less rate of interest compared to other tranches, while equity or toxic\ntranche have high default risks, so this toxic tranche securities carry a high\nrate of interest. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 1980s, after the growth of MBS and CDOs, the securitization of the mortgage market increased considerably. At most of mortgage companies, the mortgages were originated with the intention of selling them to Securitizers (Originate-to-Distribute (OTD) model<\/em>). Majority of the securitization was done by the three GSEs. The contribution of GSEs to securitization of mortgages is astonishing: in early 1908s, agency MBS represented approximately 50 percent of the mortgage market, went up to 64 percent by 1992 and a 73 percent by 2002. However, after 2002, the mortgage as well as securitization market changes dramatically, with non-agency MBSs representing 15 percent in 2003, 23 percent in 2004, 31 percent in 2005, 32 percent in 2006, and overcoming agency MBSs \u2013 56 percent in 2006. A large portion of this issuance consisted of subprime and Alt-A loans. Non-prime mortgages were only 14 percent of the total mortgages in 2001 and it jumped to 48 percent of the total in 2006. Many of these subprime loans were of adjustable rate loans, due to be reset in the period 2007-2009, which played a part in the advent of the financial crisis of our time.(To be continued in June 2019 edition)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

What is this financial crisis? How it has impacted the world economy as well as India\u2019s? How it has impacted a common man, a housewife, and a college going student? What are the lessons for today\u2019s aspiring managers? <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":34,"featured_media":21755,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[5,22],"tags":[156,157],"class_list":["post-55190","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-finance","category-global-economy","tag-financial-crisis","tag-sub-prime-crisis"],"yoast_head":"\nLESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR TODAY\u2019S MANAGERS - The Public Economist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/thepubliceconomist.com\/?p=55190\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS FOR TODAY\u2019S MANAGERS - The Public Economist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"What is this financial crisis? 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